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BARGAINING POWER ON BROADWAY: 
WHY CONGRESS SHOULD PASS THE 
PLAYWRIGHTS LICENSING ANTITRUST 
INITIATIVE ACT IN THE ERA OF 
HOLLYWOOD ON BROADWAY 
Ashley Kelly∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The presence of “pic-to-legit musicals” on Broadway has been 
around for decades.1 In recent years, Broadway has seen its share 
of motion pictures turned into musical hits2 as well as 
                                                           
 ∗ Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2009; B.A. Barnard College, 2004. The 
author wishes to thank Ralph Sevush and David Faux, Brooklyn Law School 
‘05, for giving her the opportunity to intern with the Dramatists Guild. She 
would also like to thank her parents, Hugh and Suzy Kelly, and her brothers, 
Chris and Sean, for understanding why she could not come home for 
Thanksgiving. Finally, she wishes to thank Will Page for keeping her head on 
straight. 
1 The industry term “pic-to-legit musicals” refers to motion pictures that 
become plays in “legitimate” theatre. See Gordon Cox, Broadway’s “Blonde” 
Ambition, VARIETY, Mar. 26, 2007–Apr. 1, 2007, at 39 (“‘Sweet Charity’ 
(1966) was based on ‘Nights of Cabiria,’ ‘Applause’ (1970) grew out of ‘All 
About Eve,’ and ‘Nine’ (1982) took its story from ‘8 ½ . . . .’”). 
2 “ ‘The Lion King’ (1997), ‘The Producers’ (2001) and ‘Hairspray’ 
(2002) [were] among the winners at both the box office and at the Tonys.” Id. 
“The Lion King,” adapted from the 1994 animated Disney film, has won over 
thirty major theatre awards, including six Tony awards, and recently celebrated 
its tenth anniversary on Broadway. See Andrew Gans, Empire State Building 
and Sardi’s to Honor Disney’s Lion King, PLAYBILL, Nov. 8, 2007, available 
at http://www.playbill.com/news/article/112596.html. “The Producers,” 
adapted from the 1968 Academy Award-winning film, won twelve Tony awards, 
the most ever awarded to one show, and ran on Broadway for six years before 
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disappointments.3 The 2007–2008 Broadway season alone features 
four new musicals adapted from movies, including the Disney 
production of “The Little Mermaid” and the Mel Brooks 
adaptation of “Young Frankenstein.”4 In the coming seasons, hit 
films such as “Gladiator”5 and “Shrek”6 will also be turned into 
musical adaptations. For major motion picture studios, a musical 
based on a movie can be a windfall as it reduces the risk of 
investment.7 For critics, that same musical can provoke the fear 
that “cherished musical-theater traditions are being suborned to 
serve a disposable mass culture.”8 Outside of the studios and 
critics, however, a larger issue looms: Before a movie-musical ever 
hits a stage, there is a battle that audiences rarely think aboutthe 
                                                           
closing in April, 2007. See Kenneth Jones, Broadway Record-Breaker The 
Producers Closes April 22, PLAYBILL, Apr. 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.playbill.com/news/article/107445.html. “Hairspray,” adapted from 
the 1988 film, won eight Tony awards and is still running on Broadway. See 
http://hairspraythemusical.com/. 
3 “Dirty Rotten Scoundrels,” a 2005 musical adapted from the 1988 film, 
“never quite recouped on Broadway,” “The Wedding Singer,” a 2006 musical 
adapted from the 1998 film “floundered,” and “High Fidelity,” another 2006 
musical based on the 2000 film “as well as the book, barely opened.” See Cox, 
supra note 1. 
4 Michael Kuchwara, New Broadway Season: The Play’s the Thing, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 30, 2007, available at www.newsday.com/ 
entertainment/stage/ny-ffthe5391193sep30,0,161117.story. 
5 See Mac Rogers, From Screen to Stage: How to Turn a Movie into a 
Musical, SLATE, May 23, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2142258/. 
“Gladiator,” won the 2001 Academy Award for Best Picture and grossed over 
450 million dollars worldwide. See IMDB, Gladiator, http://www.imdb.com/ 
title/tt0172495/ (follow “Awards” hyperlink; then follow “Box Office/Business” 
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
6 John Weidman, The Seventh Annual Media and Society Lecture: 
Protecting the American Playwright, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 644 (2007) 
(“The Shrek imprint represents a franchise of goldmine-like proportions.”) The 
first “Shrek” film grossed 455 million dollars and the first sequel grossed 880 
million dollars. Id. 
7 See Rogers, supra note 5 (“The beauty of the movie-musical is that the 
branding is already in place.”). 
8 Id. “Their fear is that Broadway is becoming an adjunct to Hollywood, 
where desperation to reach a mass audience raised on movies and television” 
forces a dilution of traditional theatre. Id. 
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battle for copyright control between the playwright and the 
studio.9 
At the core of this battle is the recognition that playwrights and 
screenwriters deal in two distinct legal realities.10 This distinction 
centers on the work made for hire doctrine of the Copyright Act of 
1976, which carves out an exception to the rule that copyright 
ownership vests in the party who actually created a work.11 If a 
work is made for hire, the employer or hiring party is considered to 
be the author and owns the copyright “unless there is a written 
agreement to the contrary.”12 Independent contractors are not 
employees under agency law,13 and their works may be “specially 
ordered or commissioned” under limited conditions, in which case 
the second clause of the work for hire doctrine applies and the 
commissioning party controls the copyright.14 In order to actually 
be a work made for hire under the second clause, two conditions 
must be met: (1) the work has to fall within one of nine specified 
categories,15 and (2) there must be a written agreement between the 
parties that states the work is a work made for hire.16 Screenwriters 
clearly fall into the “part of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
                                                           
9 See Weidman, supra note 6, at 645 (“The studio’s interest in 
maintaining control of the content of the stage version of [a movie] seems 
irreconcilable with the theatrical mandate which gives the playwright ultimate 
control of the work which he creates.”). 
10 See id. at 641–42 (“A screenwriter is an employee. . . . From the 
beginning, he understands that everything he writes will immediately become 
the property of the studio which employs him . . . . The playwright is an 
independent contractor. He owns his own work and is free to dispose of it as he 
sees fit.”). 
11 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) 
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1989)). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 751. 
14 U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 9.1104, Nov. 2004, at 1, available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf. 
15 The nine categories are (1) a collective work; (2) as a part of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work; (3) as a translation; (4) as a supplementary 
work; (5) as a compilation; (6) as an instructional text; (7) as a test; (8) as 
answer materials for a test; or (9) as an atlas. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007). 
16 U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 14, at 2. 
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work” category, meaning any work they do for a studio is owned 
by that larger entity.17 In contrast, plays, and more broadly, 
dramatic works, are not one of the nine categories and the work of 
playwrights may not be specially ordered or commissioned like a 
motion picture screenplay.18 
This brings us back to the battle between studios and 
playwrights and the increasing presence of Hollywood on 
Broadway with movie-musicals. Movie studios are producing on 
Broadway in increasing numbers, but with the assumption that 
they are in control of playwrights’ works as works for hire.19 John 
Weidman, president of the Dramatists Guild,20 warns against the 
dangers of allowing studios acting as producers on Broadway to 
make their own rulesin essence, “build[ing] a wall around them 
and keep[ing] them quarantined.”21 Weidman argues that while 
individual playwrights have been resisting the pressures to work 
under a work for hire regime, he admits that “with the appearance 
of more and more studio-produced musicals like ‘Tarzan’ and 
                                                           
17 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007). 
18 Alison Zamora, Legislative Update: The Playwright Licensing Antitrust 
Initiative Act: Empowering the “Starving Artist” Through the Convergence of 
Copyright, Labor, and Antitrust Policies, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 
& POL’Y 395, 421 (2006) (“[A] playwright is not an employee of the producer, 
but rather an independent contractor.”); see 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also 
Dramatists Guild’s Business Affairs FAQ, http://www.dramatistsguild.com/ 
business_faq.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2007) (“[Work made for hire] is not an 
acceptable condition for writing in the theater, where authors still are entitled to 
own and control their own work.”). 
19 See Weidman, supra note 6, at 645 (“[T]he most aggressive of the 
movie studios [bring] with them . . . a desire to do business, not according to 
the theater model which put[s] the playwright in first position, but according to 
the Hollywood model, in which the producing studio own[s] the author’s 
copyright and writers [can] be hired and fired at will.”). 
20 The Dramatists Guild is an advocacy organization composed of 
playwrights, composers, and lyricists “who write for the first class theater and 
who represent the common interests of playwrights.” Barr v. Dramatists Guild, 
573 F. Supp. 555, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Weidman, supra note 6, at 639 
(“The Dramatists Guild is the only national organization representing the 
interests of playwrights, composers, and lyricists writing for the living stage.”). 
21 Weidman, supra note 6, at 645 (“[A]s a general rule, what one producer 
gets, all producers want.”). 
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‘Aida,’ [these] pressures [on playwrights to relinquish copyright] 
are only going to grow more intense.”22 
In light of these mounting pressures, Congress must intervene. 
Unlike screenwriters, playwrights are forced to negotiate with 
studios without the collective bargaining power of an organization 
like the Writers Guild of America (“WGA”)23 because Congress 
has not granted the Dramatists Guild the right to collectively 
bargain on behalf of playwrights.24 For years, senators and house 
representatives have proposed bills allowing the Dramatists Guild 
the ability to collectively bargain.25 However, none of the bills have 
ever been put to a vote.26 
This Note advocates that now is the time for Congress to act 
on behalf of playwrights by passing the Playwrights Licensing 
Antitrust Initiative Act,27 which would allow playwrights as a 
group to collectively bargain with the powerful Hollywood studios 
now producing on Broadway.28 Part I addresses the functional 
differences between playwrights and screenwriters and the varied 
impact that the work made for hire doctrine has on playwrights and 
screenwriters. Part II discusses bargaining power in the 
entertainment industry, focusing on the negotiating power of the 
Dramatists Guild and the WGA. Part III looks at the past and 
current state of the Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act. 
                                                           
22 Id. at 644. 
23 The WGA is a labor union and screenwriters’ collective bargaining 
representative in the motion picture and television industry. Wellman v. Writers 
Guild of Am., W., 146 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 1998). 
24 See ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL., THEATER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
80 (2004) (“Because producers typically have the upper hand in . . . 
negotiations, the [Dramatists] Guild has wanted to engage in collective 
bargaining but cannot do soas a trade association rather than a labor union, its 
activities are not shielded from the federal anti-trust laws.”). 
25 Zamora, supra note 18, at 395. 
26 Id. 
27 Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, S. 2349, 108th 
Cong. (2004). 
28 The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the 
Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Senator 
Orin Hatch). 
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Part IV advocates for why, in light of past legislative arguments 
and the growing presence of Hollywood studios as producers, 
Congress should act now to bring a balance of bargaining power to 
Broadway by passing the Playwrights Licensing Antitrust 
Initiative Act. 
I.  AUTHORIAL CONTROL: WRITING FOR THE STAGE AND SCREEN 
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that copyright ownership 
“vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”29 The 
Supreme Court generally considers the author to be “the party who 
actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea 
into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.”30 
However, there is an exception to this rule, which is at the core of 
the legal division between screenwriters and playwrights: the work 
made for hire doctrine.31 Section 101 of the copyright law defines a 
“work made for hire” as: 
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of 
his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or 
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, 
as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a 
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as 
an instructional text, as a test, as answer materials for a test, 
or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written 
instrument signed by them that the work shall be 
considered a work made for hire.32 
 If a work is created by an independent contractor, then the 
work may be “specially ordered or commissioned” and therefore 
                                                           
29 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2007). 
30 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) 
(citing 17 U.S.C. §102 (2007)). 
31 See Weidman, supra note 6, at 641–42; 17 U.S.C. § 201 (“In the case 
of a work-made-for-hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was 
prepared is considered the author . . . and, unless the parties have expressly 
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights 
comprised in the copyright.” ). 
32 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007); see U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 14, at 1. 
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falls under the second clause of the work for hire doctrine,33 so long 
as two conditions are met: that the work falls within one of nine 
specified categories listed within 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) and that there 
is a written agreement that states the work is a work made for 
hire.34 The fundamental difference between screenwriters and 
playwrights under the Copyright Act is that screenwriters write as 
“part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,”35 thereby 
working for hire, whereas playwrights do not fall into any of the 
nine categories and subsequently maintain control of their 
copyright.36 John Weidman put it best when he said, “[t]he 
intermittent sense of suicidal desperation which playwrights and 
screenwriters sometimes share is about the only thing they 
share.”37 
A.  Playwrights: Creators for the Great White Way 
The Dramatists Guild defines a playwright as any bookwriter, 
composer, or lyricist who is involved in the initial stages of the 
theatrical collaborative process and whose contribution is an 
integral part of a play as presented in subsequent productions by 
other producers.38 The playwright solely controls structure, 
dialogue, theme, and plot.39 
Additionally, as author of a play, the playwright owns the 
                                                           
33 U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 14, at 2. 
34 Id. 
35 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007). 
36 Zamora, supra note 18, at 421 (“[A] playwright is not an employee of 
the producer, but rather an independent contractor.”). See 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2007). See also Dramatists Guild’s Business Affairs FAQ, supra note 18 
(“[Work made for hire] is not an acceptable condition for writing in the theater, 
where authors still are entitled to own and control their own work.”). 
37 Weidman, supra note 6, at 641. 
38 Douglas Nevin, No Business Like Show Business: Copyright Law, The 
Theatre Industry, and the Dilemma of Rewarding Collaboration, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 1533, 1544 (2004). 
39 Charles Isherwood, Go East, Young Writers, For Theater! N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2007, at E1 (as opposed to the screenwriter whose work can be 
“parceled out among a dozen writers and script supervisors and subject to 
executive meddling”). 
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intellectual property.40 These rights include the copyright of the 
play or musical.41 Because the playwright owns her work and is 
free to dispose of it as she sees fit, the playwright can grant a 
producer a defined package of performance rights for a limited time 
while reserving all other rights to herself.42  
Specified in most playwright licensing contracts with producers 
is that all changes made to the script, title, stage business, or 
performance of the play or musical also belong to the playwright.43 
Many licensing agreements between playwrights and producers 
also specify that the playwright shall receive a percentage of the 
gross box office receipts from the initial production of the work44 
and retain ownership and control over all subsequent 
productions.45 Indeed, a playwright is the only creator in the 
theater industry who enjoys the exclusivity of retaining the right of 
copyright ownership.46 Playwrights are not typically hired to write 
exclusively for an individual producer or Broadway theater.47 
Though occasionally a theater or producer will commission a play, 
most plays “are simply writtenby someone, somewhere with an 
impulse and an idea.”48 More importantly, playwrights do not 
                                                           
40 See Richard Garmise, Author’s Bill of Rights, DRAMATIST, Oct. 1993, 
available at http://www.dramatistsguild.com/files/authbill.pdf. 
41 Id. 
42 Weidman, supra note 6, at 641–42. 
43 Nevin, supra note 38, at 1540; see Garmise, supra note 40. Typically, a 
producer may make changes to the play with the playwright’s consent, but 
regardless of whether the producer or the author composed the emendations, the 
intellectual property belongs to the playwright. Id. 
44 Typically between 5% and 7% of the gross weekly box office receipts. 
See Richard Garmise, The Art of the Deal, Part 1: Money, Money, Money, 
DRAMATIST, Nov. 1994, at 1. 
45 See id. at 2. See also Nevin, supra note 38, at 1540. 
46 Nevin, supra note 38, at 1540. See Weidman, supra note 6, at 642 (“[I]t 
is in the theater, and only in the theater, that [the playwright] . . . knows his 
own unique, idiosyncratic voice will be heard, unedited and uncompromised.”). 
47 See Zamora, supra note 18, at 421 (explaining that the relationship 
between a producer and a playwright is limited to “the time it takes to 
produce . . . one play” and if the producer wants to continue to work with the 
playwright, “a new contract would have to be devised”). 
48 Weidman, supra note 6, at 642. 
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write plays as works made for hire.49 
A playwright is not an employee under the first clause of the 
work made for hire doctrine.50 In Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, the Supreme Court articulated a multi-factor test 
for determining under what circumstances a creator acts as an 
independent contractor and when she is an employee.51 The factors 
to consider are (1) the hiring party’s right to control the manner 
and means by which the product is accomplished; (2) the skill 
required; (3) the source of the instrumentalities and tools; (4) the 
location of the work; (5) the duration of the relationship between 
the parties; (6) whether the hiring parties have a right to assign 
additional projects to the hired party; (7) the extent of the hired 
parties’ discretion over when and how long to work; (8) the 
method of payment; (9) the hired party’s role in hiring and paying 
assistants; (10) whether the work is part of the regular business of 
the hiring party; (11) whether the hiring party is in business; (12) 
the provision of employee benefits; and (13) the tax treatment of 
the hired party.52 
Applying the Supreme Court’s test to the relationship between 
producers and playwrights, the factors demonstrate that 
playwrights are not employees of producers.53 Producers do not 
control the manner and means by which a play is written or 
developed, rather, producers only become involved after a play has 
been completed.54 The skill required is solely the playwright’s 
specialized writing ability and talent and the source of the 
instrumentality is her own imagination.55 The playwright uses her 
own workspace and the working relationship with the producer 
                                                           
49 See Dramatists Guild’s Business Affairs FAQ, supra note 18. 
50 17 U.S.C. §101 (2007). Under the first clause of the work made for hire 
doctrine, a work qualifies as a work made for hire if it was “prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment.” Weidman, supra note 6, 
at 641 (“The playwright is an independent contractor. He owns his work and is 
free to dispose of it as he sees fit.”). 
51 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989). 
52 Id.  
53 Zamora, supra note 18, at 421. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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encompasses only the time it takes to produce the play.56 The play 
is only licensed to the producer.57 Thus, the ability for a producer 
to assign additional projects to the playwright is irrelevant, as is 
the producer’s discretion over the timeline the playwright works, 
since the relationship does not commence until after a play is 
completed.58  
The method of payment to the playwright is governed by the 
licensing agreement.59 The playwright does not receive a salary, and 
the playwright hires her own dramaturges60 if she requires them.61 
There are no employment benefits bestowed upon the playwright 
and producers do not take taxes out of the playwright’s share of 
the profits from the production.62 Rather than outright control by a 
producer, producers in the theater industry are rewarded for their 
investment through subsidiary rights.63 In exchange for the initial 
risk of developing a play’s first production, a producer is often 
entitled to a percentage of all subsequent licensing of the play and 
sometimes even a percentage of other rights such as film 
adaptations.64 A playwright also does not come under the second 
section of the work for hire doctrine because dramatic works do not 
fall into one of the nine specified categories.65 
                                                           
56 Id. 
57 See Dramatist’s Bill of Rights, http://www.dramatistsguild.com/about_ 
rights.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2008) (“When a university, producer or theatre 
wants to mount a production of your play, you actually license (or lease) the 
public performance rights to your dramatic property to that entity for a finite 
period of time.”). 
58 Zamora, supra note 18, at 421. 
59 See Garmise, supra note 40, at 1. 
60 See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 197 n.5 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 
role of the dramaturg can include any number of the elements that go into the 
crafting of a play, such as actual plot elements, dramatic structure, character 
details, themes, and even specific language.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
61 Zamora, supra note 18, at 421. 
62 Id. 
63 Nevin, supra note 38, at 1541. 
64 Id. 
65 A playwright’s play is not “a contribution to a collective work, . . . a 
part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, . . . a translation, . . . a 
supplementary work, . . . a compilation, . . . an instructional text, . . . a 
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However, a playwright’s ability to retain copyright is not 
absolute. A playwright may assign her copyright to a producer,66 
and indeed some contracts with producers require such provisions. 
For example, a contract may contain language stating that if the 
work is not a work made for hire, the playwright nonetheless 
irrevocably transfers and assigns the producer all rights, title, and 
interest therein, including all copyrights.67 Unaware of the 
ramifications, playwrights often sign such contracts, without 
understanding that they are losing their rightfully entitled 
intellectual property for at least 35 years, at which point they may 
terminate the transfer of rights to the producer.68 In an industry 
riddled with egoism, paranoia, and severe financial hardship,69 
playwrights are often blinded by “artistic euphoria and dreams of 
box office glory” and frequently fail to consider legal and business 
safeguards in their contracts.70 
Though playwrights enjoy the unique privilege of retaining 
copyright ownership, it is a right that must be safeguarded. 
Playwrights are considered at the bottom of the “financial totem 
pole” in the theater industry71 and accordingly have little bargaining 
leverage with producers, especially large motion picture studios 
acting as producers.72 Because standards in theater are low to begin 
                                                           
test, . . . answer materials for a test, or . . . an atlas.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007). 
66 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2007). 
67 The playwright, through a written conveyance, may transfer in whole or 
in part “any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright.” See 17 U.S.C. § 
201(d). 
68 See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2007). 
69 Nevin, supra note 38, at 1540. Though a playwright may write many 
plays throughout her career, a play’s production is expensive and complicated, 
but unless a play is produced, the playwright does not earn any money from her 
craft. Even if it is produced once, it is rare that it is optioned for additional 
productions. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Law in the Plays of Elmer Rice, 19 
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 401, 403–04 (2007) (“A new play almost always 
has to be instantly successful to last more than a brief time, and if its initial 
production does not succeed, it is unlikely ever to be produced again.”). 
70 Nevin, supra note 38, at 1540. 
71 See Isherwood, supra note 39, at E1 (“[I]t is not easy to earn a good 
living strictly as a playwright.”). See also Jonakait, supra note 69, at 403–04. 
72 See Weidman, supra note 6, at 644. 
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with, the average advance against royalties for a 99-seat production 
is only between $2,000 and $5,000, with a 5% to 7% share in gross 
box office receipts post-recoupment.73 If a playwright is successful 
enough to engage a Broadway production, the starting advance will 
be significantly higher but still not very lucrative, usually in the 
range of tens of thousands of dollars.74  
With such small returns and little safeguard against the 
bargaining strength of producers, playwrights are increasingly 
drawn to Hollywood to write for television and film, giving up 
their roles for those as screenwriters.75 While they are more likely 
to earn enough money to support their writing careers,76 they 
                                                           
73 See Victor Knapp & Ralph Sevush, The Money Flow, DRAMATIST, 
July–Aug. 2001, at Newsletter 2–3. The advance that a small theater gives a 
playwright is non-refundable but recoupable from the royalties that the 
playwright earns from ticket sales of an entire production run. DONALD A. 
FARBER, PRODUCING THEATRE: A COMPREHENSIVE AND LEGAL BUSINESS 
GUIDE 196 (3d ed. 2006). The production contract usually will specify how 
many performances the play has been licensed for, but this typically does not 
alter the amount of the advance. Id. Recoupment occurs when all production 
costs incurred in presenting a play for a given production have been returned to 
the investors of the play. Id. 
74 See, e.g., HAROLD L. FOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS 
468 (7th ed. 2001) (“The fees for rights for a major performance of [a show like 
Rodgers and Hammerstein’s musical “Oklahoma”] are customarily in the area of 
8% of box-office gross, with an advance against royalties of $18,000 or more.”). 
Though more than the advance for a small theatre production or Off-Broadway, 
this is still lower than the multi-million dollar advances seen by Hollywood 
screenwriters. See Dana Kennedy, Screenwriters Adjust to Being Bit Players 
Again, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at B15 (“The newcomer, David Benioff, was 
paid $1.8 million upfront for ‘Stay.’”). 
75 Nevin, supra note 38, at 1569 (“Despite intermittent moments of 
excellence, the American theatre has faced a considerable challenge during the 
last few decades. Exciting and vital artists are decamping for the hills of 
Hollywood, taking with them the innovative approaches that define each 
generation of the theatrical movement.”); see also The Playwrights Licensing 
Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the Future of American Live Theater: 
Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) 
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Marsha Norman, Vice President, Dramatists 
Guild). 
76 See Isherwood, supra note 39, at E1 (“In theory a talented writer 
interested in making plays and making a living in other media should be able to 
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ultimately sacrifice their intellectual property rights in Hollywood. 
B.  Screenwriters: All of the Money, None of the Control 
In sharp contrast to playwrights, film and television 
screenwriters are almost always employees of a production, and 
their work product is normally characterized as work for hire.77 In 
essence, screenwriters are paid to write. This includes plots, 
characters, twists, turns, and whatever else the studio desires.78  
Typically a screenwriter receives a large advance from her studio 
before she even begins writing and will receive additional sums of 
money as subsequent drafts are submitted.79 A standard option 
payment for a feature film can range from $10,000 to $25,000.80 
From the 1920s until the late 1940s, movie studios had their 
own “stables of writers” composed of screenwriters tied 
exclusively to particular studios.81 These screenwriters were 
                                                           
do both. But in practice it doesn’t seem easy. A lot of writers who head west 
never look back . . . . Young writers who win some acclaim for a first or second 
play will probably continue to head west before they have had time to develop, 
which means the theater is potentially losing important voices before they 
mature.”). 
77 Nevin, supra note 38, at 1542. See Matthew J. McDonough, Moral 
Rights and the Movies: The Threat and Challenge of the Digital Domain, 31 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 473 (1997) (“Because of a significant disparity in 
bargaining power, directors and screenwriters are almost always employed or 
otherwise contracted for work pursuant to the work for hire doctrine, with the 
motion picture studio alone as copyright owner.”). 
78 Weidman, supra note 6, at 642. 
79 Id. 
80 STEPHEN BREIMER, THE SCREENWRITER’S LEGAL GUIDE 12 (3d ed. 
2004). The option payment gives a producer exclusive control to use the 
screenwriter’s work. When the option period expires, it can be exercised and the 
work can be purchased, at which time the screenwriter receives a purchase 
payment, which can be hundreds of thousands of dollars additionally paid to the 
screenwriter. Id. at 11–13. 
81 Id. at 1. During this time, Hollywood ran on a “studio system,” with 
major studios (e.g., MGM, Paramount, etc.) producing movies on their own 
lots with creative personnel (directors, actors, and screenwriters) under long-term 
contracts. See Mark Weinstein, Profit-Sharing Contracts in Hollywood: 
Evolution and Analysis, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 71 (1998). 
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employees within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act and 
work for hire doctrine.82 However, as the large movie studios’ 
empires began to crumble,83 so did the practice of retaining in-
house screenwriters.84 Thus, when the Copyright Act came up for 
revision in the 1960s, movie studios were some of the most vocal 
lobbying forces in Congress.85 Because of their efforts (and likely 
their financial resources), the studios were successful in having 
motion pictures included among the nine exceptions of the second 
clause of the work for hire definition.86 Specifically, the works of 
screenwriters are characterized as “specially commissioned works” 
under 17 U.S.C. § 101(2), vesting all copyright ownership with the 
motion picture or television studio.87 
Under this scheme, the studio is considered the sole legal author 
of the script and may fully exploit a screenwriter’s creation.88  
                                                           
82 See 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1909). See also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 748 (1989) (determining an employment relationship 
existed sufficient to give the hiring party copyright ownership whenever that 
party has the right to control or supervise the artist’s work). 
83 Hollywood moved away from the studio system after the 1948 decision 
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 
131 (1948), which forced the major studios to dissolve their monopolies over 
vertically integrated exhibition, production, and distribution studio systems. See 
Weinstein, supra note 81, at 71. 
84 As the studio systems dissolved, the amount of writers under contract by 
the studios dropped. See Weinstein, supra note 81, at 89. 
85 See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision, Part 5: 1964 Revision Bill with 
Discussion and Comments Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 298–
309 (1965) (statement by the Motion Picture Association of America) 
[hereinafter MPAA Statement] (“We have indicated all along that provisions 
such as [the work for hire provisions] are the heart and soul of the operation of 
commercial and personnel relationships in our industry, without which there 
would be a very severe upset.”). 
86 See Seth F. Gorman, Who Owns the Movies? Joint Authorship under the 
Copyright Act of 1976 after Childress v. Taylor and Thomson v. Larson, 7 
U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 23 (1999). 
87 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007). See also Gorman, supra note 86, at 23. 
88 BREIMER, supra note 80, at 4 (“[O]ur own laws have helped to reinforce 
the philosophy that the employed writer can be forgotten.”); see Weidman, 
supra note 6, at 641 (“As legal author of the film, [the] studio can change the 
content of the screenwriter’s script at will. His pirate captain can become a 
teenage runaway, his teenage runaway a Cocker Spaniel, his original story, set 
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While playwrights do their own rewriting and have the last word 
on their scripts, Hollywood scripts do not remain in the hands of 
just one screenwriter and are almost always rewritten by another, if 
not many other screenwriters.89 Moreover, because the studios 
own the copyright in scripts, they have “free reign to decide 
whether to modify the content of a film to suit [their] . . . needs.”90 
Though screenwriters have been known to balk at the creative 
control they forfeit to studios,91 Stephen Breimera well-known 
Hollywood entertainment attorney92advises screenwriters to 
“not bite the hand that feeds you. . . . [W]hine about [the system] 
and you will be labeled a whiner. . . . [T]he system is the system. It 
is unlikely to change.”93 Because a screenwriter relinquishes all 
creative control over her screenplay, her name becomes her sole 
professional asset.94 However, even the decision to credit a 
screenwriter by name is relinquished to the producer.95 
                                                           
in Boston during the War of 1812, can be moved to the fifth moon of Jupiter.”). 
89 BREIMER, supra note 80, at 2. 
90 “Absent a contractual agreement to the contrary, filmmakers remain 
powerless to prevent a studio from making significant changes to a motion 
picture.” McDonough, supra note 77, at 477. Modern digital technology makes 
it possible for a studio to alter, delete, or add scenes to a film to make it more 
palatable to certain audiences. Id. at 476. 
91 See, e.g., Sean Mitchell, Written Out of the Script, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
11, 2007, at M1 (“Regardless of the head-turning sums they can make, 
screenwriters are often treated like second-class Hollywood citizens, routinely 
replaced by other writers and often not even invited to the set of a movie they’ve 
written.”). 
92 Stephen Breimer is a partner of Bloom, Hergott, and Diemer, LLP, in 
Beverly Hills, California. Prior to his legal career in entertainment law, he 
produced for film and television. See BREIMER, supra note 80, at xviii–xvix. 
93 Id. at 6. 
94 Wellman v. Writers Guild of Am., W., 146 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 
1998) (“The credit does not merely satisfy a writer’s longing to see his name in 
lights; it can propel him to other workperhaps to the next blockbuster.”). 
95 Id. 
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II.  BARGAINING WITH STUDIO PRODUCERS: WRITERS AND 
GUILD POWER 
For a Hollywood studio, obtaining copyright ownership for the 
works it creates is perceived as essential in order to fully exploit 
the works regardless of whether the works are major motion 
pictures or pic-to-legit musicals.96 Production and exploitation of a 
work often requires a studio to risk millions of dollars,97 and if the 
studio did not have all rights in the work, expenses would 
drastically increase. For example, industry essentials such as 
marketing could be subject to a multitude of termination rights that 
would be difficult to overcome.98 Not surprisingly, because the 
studio has a financial interest behind the work, it tries to ensure 
that it is holding the entire bundle of rights.99 
Generally, the work made for hire doctrine tips the negotiating 
scales in favor of the copyright holder.100 To help promote more 
balance in Hollywood, a strong collection of guilds has formed to 
support the creative employees negotiating with big studios.101 For 
                                                           
96 See Michael Carter Smith, Work For Hire: Revision on the Horizon, 30 
IDEA: L.J. & TECH. 21, 29–30 (1989). 
 97 According to the Motion Picture Association of America, major motion 
picture studios pay an average of $106.6 million to produce and market a film.  
See Josh Friedman, Movie Ticket Sales Hit Record; But a Report on the 
Industry’s Health May Understate the True Cost of Making Films, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 6, 2008, at C1. 
98 See Smith, supra note 96, at 31. Without sole ownership of all rights, 
the studio would be obligated to keep track of multiple licenses subject to 
termination, limiting not only their ability to exploit the work of the 
screenwriter but also the director and the many creative contributors to a film. 
For example, a producer may not be able to sell a film in a foreign market unless 
nationality vests in one authorthe studio. Id. 
99 See Karen L. Gulick, Creative Control, Attribution, and the Need for 
Disclosure: A Study of Incentives in the Motion Picture Industry, 27 CONN. L. 
REV. 53, 66 (1994). 
100 Id. 
101 Movie and television actors are represented by the Screen Actors Guild 
and the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists. MELVIN 
SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW 105 (3d ed. 2003). The writers are 
represented by the WGA. See infra Part II.A. The directors are represented by 
KELLY 7/21/08  4:06 PM 
 BARGAINING POWER ON BROADWAY 893 
instance, film and television writers are represented by the WGA, 
which has the ability to collectively bargain with the studios.102 
Within the context of Hollywood productions on Broadway, it is 
increasingly common for the studios to collectively bargain with 
the Actors Equity Association,103 which represents live theater 
performers, and the Local One of the International Alliance of 
Theatrical Stage Employees (“IATSE”).104 Playwrights, however, 
cannot participate in these types of collective bargaining 
conversations because, while they may be members of the 
Dramatists Guild, the Dramatists Guild is not enabled to enter into 
collectively bargained agreements.105 Subsequently, while 
screenwriters gain a certain amount of bargaining power through 
their guild, playwrights are left without strong advocates.106 
                                                           
the Directors Guild of America. SIMENSKY, supra note 101, at 105; see also 
infra note 136. 
102 Wellman v. Writers Guild of Am., W., 146 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 
1998). See also infra Part II.A. 
103 Founded in 1913, Actor’s Equity Association is the labor union 
representing American actors and stage managers in the theatre. The organization 
collectively bargains on behalf of the actors and stage managers. See 
http://www.actorsequity.org/AboutEquity/aboutequityhome.asp (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2008). 
104 Local One of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees is 
the labor union that represents Broadway stagehands. The organization has the 
power to collectively bargain with producers. See http://www.iatselocalone.org/ 
about/aboutus.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). 
105 The Dramatists Guild is a trade organization, as opposed to a labor 
union, and its activities are not shielded from federal anti-trust laws. See 
discussion infra Part II.B. 
106 Id. 
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A.  The Writers Guild of America: Formidable Opponent in 
Studio Negotiations 
Screenwriters are represented by one of the more powerful 
guilds in the entertainment industry.107 When disputes between 
screenwriters and producers arise, the screenwriters turn to the 
Writers Guild of America, a labor union and the screenwriters’ 
collective bargaining representative in the motion picture and 
television industry.108 The WGA primarily represents 
screenwriters involved in work made for hire situations109 and 
performs writing functions for employers engaged in the 
production of motion pictures and television.110 While 
screenwriters pay yearly dues to the WGA, the studios contribute 
as well, paying a percentage of pension, health, and welfare 
benefits to the WGA with respect to each writing assignment for 
which the studio employs a WGA member.111 
Since 1954, the WGA112 has “negotiated and administered 
minimum basic agreements with major film producers and networks 
and stations, covering theatrical and television films, broadcast and 
cable television, documentary film and radio, public and commercial 
television.”113 In recent years, the WGA has expanded its coverage 
                                                           
107 In 2007, for example, the WGA was able to gain the support of the 
Screen Actors Guild, which represents the entertainment industries acting 
celebrities, and, as a coalition, forced the canceling of the annual Golden Globe 
Awards. See Patrick Goldstein, It’s a Writers Strike, But the Actors Play a 
Major Role, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at E1; see also, e.g., Damon Lindelof, 
Mourning TV, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, at D13. 
108 Wellman v. Writers Guild of Am., W., 146 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
109 Almost all agreements between studios and screenwriters are work made 
for hire situations. Nevin, supra note 38, at 1540. 
110 Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Writers Guild of Am., W., 437 U.S. 411 
(1978). 
111 BREIMER, supra note 80, at 215. 
112 The WGA is split into two divisions: WGA, East and WGA, West. 
See Writers Guild History, http://www.wgaeast.org/index.php/articles/article/ 
499?startnum=&sort=&letter=&wgc=109# (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). 
113 Id. 
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to staff members of radio and television stations, “the latter group 
mostly in the news and documentary areas, including news writers 
and others at ABC and CBS and a number of major individual 
stations.”114 
The agreements promulgated by the WGA dominate in the 
entertainment industry.115 Members of the WGA “enjoy the 
benefits, privileges and protections under the various national 
Minimum Basic Agreements in effect in the field of radio, 
television and motion pictures.”116 WGA protections are minimum 
protections and screenwriters are often able to negotiate better 
terms based on their previous work.117 Many major motion picture 
studios’ production agreements with screenwriters are governed by 
the WGA, and WGA writers write most television network 
programming.118 Studios’ use of WGA screenwriters is so 
pervasive and exclusive that the only opportunities for non-WGA 
screenwriters are in animation, low budget pictures, and some basic 
cable programming.119 
Although the WGA originally ceded screenwriters’ copyrights 
to the studios in 1942,120 the WGA has progressively wielded its 
bargaining power over the years to try to regain more rights for 
screenwriters.121 For example, in 1988, the WGA added a provision 
to its standard agreement, known as a reversion, that allows a 
screenwriter the limited right to regain control over his copyright 
under certain conditions.122 If the screenwriter’s script is original 
                                                           
114 Id. 
115 BREIMER, supra note 80, at 287. 
116 Writers Guild History, supra note 112. 
117 BREIMER, supra note 80, at 8. 
118 Id. at 287. 
119 Id. Some of the contested issues in the 2007 WGA strike were gaining 
guild jurisdiction over animation and basic cable programming. WGA Contract 
2007 Proposals, http://www.wga.org/contract_07/proposalsfull2.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2008). 
120 See Mitchell, supra note 91, at M1 (“The agreement reached with the 
newly founded Writers Guild in 1942 contained the defining clause that survives 
to this day: ‘The studio, hereinafter, referred to as the author . . .’ making it 
clear where the writer stood after the sale of his work—or service, as it were.”). 
121 See BREIMER, supra note 80, at 42–43. 
122 Id. 
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and not adapted from any pre-existing material, the screenwriter 
may reacquire copyright of the script five years after either (1) the 
studio’s purchase or license of the material or (2) the last draft is 
written so long as the material is not in active development and the 
studio still owns the first draft.123 Because it is incredibly rare to 
see a basic reversion term in a studio contract with a screenwriter, 
this WGA provision is the only way for a writer to have a chance 
at getting back his material.124 
Today, the WGA aggressively advocates on behalf of 
screenwriters and continues to bargain with studios to keep the 
terms of the WGA Minimum Agreement on pace with 
technological advancements in the entertainment industry.125 This 
past winter, the WGA engaged in a 100-day bargaining struggle 
with studios over the future of digital media residuals for writers.126 
Every three years, the collectively bargained WGA Minimum Basic 
Agreement is renegotiated with the Alliance of Motion Picture and 
Television Producers (“AMPTP”).127 After three months of 
contentious negotiations went sour and the expiration of the most 
                                                           
123 See 2004 Writers Guild of America—Alliance of Motion Picture & 
Television Producers Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement, at § 16.A.8, 
available at http://wga.org/uploadedFiles/writers_resources/contracts/MBA04. 
pdf [hereinafter WGA Basic Agreement]. See also BREIMER, supra note 80, at 
42–43. 
124 BREIMER, supra note 80, at 43 (“The best thing about the WGA 
provision is not just that it exists, which is a major accomplishment in itself, 
but that it covers commissioned works as well as material that is purchased.”). 
125 See, e.g., Richard Verrier & Claudia Eller, Hollywood Writers Strike As 
Talks Fail; The Studios and the Guild Prepare for a Long Work Stoppage, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2007, at A1. 
126 See id.; see also Richard Verrier & Claudia Eller, Strike Report; And 
That’s a Wrap! Walkout to End; After 100 Days and Untold Losses, Writers 
Vote Overwhelmingly to Get Back to Work, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at C1. 
Digital media residuals are derived from Internet downloads, straight-to-internet 
content, on-demand online distribution, and video on demand. See Verrier & 
Eller, supra note 125, at A1; see also Lindelof, supra note 107, at D13 (“[F]or 
more than 50 years, writers have been entitled to a small cut of the studios’ 
profits from the reuse of our shows or movies; whenever something we created 
ends up in syndication or is sold on DVD, we receive royalties. But the studios 
refuse to apply the same rules to the Internet.”). 
127 See, e.g., WGA Basic Agreement, supra note 123. 
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recent contract on October 31, 2007,128 the WGA membership 
authorized a screenwriters’ strike129 which went into effect on 
November 5, 2007.130 The contentious issues were DVD 
residuals,131 union jurisdiction over animation132 and reality 
television,133 and residuals for new media.134 More than 12,000 
writers “traded their laptops for picket signs.”135 
In January, 2008, after eleven weeks of picketing and stalled 
negotiation, tensions between the WGA and AMPTP broke and 
talks resumed in the wake of an agreement made between the 
AMPTP and another industry guild, the Directors Guild of 
America.136 A month later, on February 12, 2008, the members of 
                                                           
128 Michael Cieply, To Strike or Not? Hollywood’s Next Drama, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2007, at B7. 
129 Richard Verrier, Writers Guild Votes 90% In Favor of Strike, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2007, at C1. 
130 Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, With Resolution Unlikely, Writers 
Guild Sets Strike for Monday, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2007, at C1. 
131 In April of 2004, the New York Times reported that studios made $4.8 
billion in DVD sales versus $1.78 billion at the box office. Sharon Waxman, 
Swelling Demand for Disks Alters Hollywood’s Arithmetic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
20, 2004, at E1. The WGA claims that DVD residuals are necessary to a 
writer’s income to cover periods in between employment, which is common in 
the industry. The WGA wants the residual rate to double from what amounts to 
4 cents per DVD sold up to 8 cents per DVD sold. WGA Contract 2007 
Proposals, supra note 119. 
132 According to the WGA, 100% of animated screenplays in 2005 were 
written by at least one WGA member. However, the Minimum Basic 
Agreement currently does not include animation. See WGA Contract 2007 
Proposals, supra note 119. 
133 The WGA argues that the process of creating interesting scenarios and 
shaping raw material into a narrative with conflict and character arc should fall 
under WGA contract. They advocate for the creation of “Story Producer” and 
“Supervising Story Producer” as acceptable forms of credit. See id. 
134 See Verrier & Eller, supra note 125, at A1. The WGA proposes that all 
television and theatrical content re-used on non-traditional media like the 
Internet or phones will earn a residual payment of 2.5% of the distributor’s 
gross. See WGA Contract 2007 Proposals, supra note 131. 
135 David Carr, New Media, New Values, Old Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
5, 2007, at C1. 
136 See Richard Verrier & Claudia Eller, Strike Report; Writers, Studios to 
Revive Negotiations; the Directors Accord Opens the Door to Ending the 
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the WGA voted overwhelmingly to end the strike.137 The deal 
struck between the writers and the producers provides writers with 
residual payments for shows streamed over the internet and 
secures the WGA’s jurisdiction for programming created for the 
internet.138 The WGA strike proved that there are opportunities to 
exploit the vulnerability of studios in negotiations.139 Because 
playwrights are deprived of the opportunity to collectively bargain 
in the same way that their screenwriting peers can, playwrights are 
denied an invaluable opportunity to attempt to close the gap in 
bargaining leverage in negotiations with Hollywood studios 
producing on Broadway. 
B.  The Dramatists Guild: The Toothless Voice of Playwrights 
While screenwriters have a strong labor union fighting for them, 
playwrights have no union to argue on their behalf. Instead, 
playwrights must rely on advocacy groups to collectively 
represent their interests. The most prominent of these groups is 
the Dramatists Guildan advocacy organization representing the 
common interests of playwrights, composers, and lyricists 
involved in theater.140 The Dramatists Guild was started in 1919 
under the umbrella of the Authors League of America.141 The 
                                                           
Nearly 11-Week Old Strike, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at C1. The Directors 
Guild deal doubled residual payments for television shows and films sold online 
and extended union contracts to Web shows. 
137 See Verrier & Eller, supra note 126, at C1. 
138 See Verrier & Eller, supra note 126, at C1. 
139 At the start of the strike, it was predicted that without screenwriters, an 
entire season of television would be lost, and no pilots would be shot in the 
spring. See Lindelof, supra note 107, at D13. When the strike ended in 
February 2008, it “proved to be far more economically damaging than the 
studios had expected, shutting down more than 60 TV shows, hampering 
ratings and depriving networks of tens of millions of advertising dollars.” Verrier 
& Eller, supra note 126, at C1. 
140 Barr v. Dramatists Guild, 573 F. Supp. 555, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See 
Mission Statement of the Dramatists Guild, http://www.dramatistsguild.com/ 
about_mission.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
141 The Authors League of America includes the Authors Guild, which 
solely represents book authors and the Dramatists Guild. See History of the 
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purpose of the Dramatists Guild is to “protect and promote the 
professional interests of playwrights” by advocating “to improve 
the conditions under which their works are created and 
produced.”142 The Dramatists Guild not only represents the 
interests involved in theatrical productions, but also “those broader 
concerns which affect directly or indirectly the role of the theatre in 
society.”143 
As an advocate for playwrights, the Dramatists Guild 
advocates for the enhancement of playwrights’ bargaining power 
by encouraging playwrights to negotiate for terms the Dramatists 
Guild pushes as minimum standards producers should meet, 
promulgating model agreements for use by members,144 and 
advising members on standard industry terms concerning advances, 
royalties, billing, and script changes.145 For first-class productions, 
such as a large-scale Broadway musical or play, playwrights that 
are members of the Dramatists Guild are encouraged to use a guild 
                                                           
Dramatists Guild of America, http://www.dramatistsguild.com/about_ 
history.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2008) (“Matters of joint concern to authors and 
dramatists, such as copyright and freedom of expression, remain in the province 
of the [Authors] League, other matters, such as contract terms and subsidiary 
rights, are in the province of the [g]uilds.”). 
142 Barr, 573 F. Supp. at 563. 
143 Mission Statement of the Dramatists Guild, supra note 140 (the 
Dramatists Guild claims it carries out its mission by “[f]ormulating production 
contracts; [p]romoting and protecting playwrights through these contracts . . . ; 
[e]xpressing a public opinion . . . on issues which affect the role the [playwright] 
plays in the theatre and in society in general; [w]orking with other theatrical 
institutions to educate them to the primacy of the author in theatrical 
production; [and] [i]dentifying emerging trends in theatre, and responding 
affirmatively and actively on an institutional basis to such trends.”). 
144 JARVIS, supra note 24, at 80 (“[These agreements are] respectively 
known as the ‘Approved Production Contract for Plays’ and the ‘Approved 
Production Contract for Musicals.’”). 
145 Members of the Dramatists Guild are encouraged to meet with the 
Director of Business Affairs when they are approached with production 
agreements to discuss the contracts before signing and to learn about how they 
can advocate for better terms. However, it is the playwright who must negotiate 
on her own with a producer, not the Dramatists Guild on her behalf. See 
Dramatists Guild Member Benefits, Business Advice, http://www. 
dramatistsguild.com/mem_benefits_business.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
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certified Approved Production Contract (“APC”).146 The APC is a 
licensing agreement which sets forth minimum terms relating to 
fees, advances against royalties, territorial restrictions, and 
subsidiary rights for stock and amateur performances as well as 
motion picture rights.147 Moreover, the APC grants the producer 
the right to produce the play as written by the playwright, but 
protects the playwright by preventing the producer from making 
any changes to the text, lyrics and/or music.148 The playwright 
additionally retains the right to approve the director, the cast, and 
all other creative elements of the play such as the scenic, costume 
and lighting designers.149 The APC is negotiated between the 
playwright’s agent and the producer, who is often supported by 
the League of American Theaters and Producers.150 The APC then 
goes through a certification process by the Dramatists Guild, to 
ensure that the negotiated contract conforms to the minimum 
standards of the Dramatists Guild.151 If an APC does not conform 
to these terms, the playwright is asked to leave the guild.152 
For all the goals that the Dramatists Guild strives for, however, 
it cannot really enforce the APC as a requirement of the theatre 
industry, leaving playwrights to ultimately negotiate their own 
                                                           
146 The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the 
Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Gerald 
Schoenfeld, Chairman of The League of American Theaters and Producers). 
147 Id. 
148 See ALEXANDER LINDSEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, Approved Production 
Contract for Plays, in 5 LINDSEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING, & THE 
ARTS § 11:8 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter APC]. Article VIII, Section 8.02(b) 
requires that any changes that are made shall be the property of the playwright. 
149 Id. at Art. 1, § 1.01(b). 
150 See Hearing, supra note 146 (statement of Gerald Schoenfeld, Chairman 
of The League of American Theaters and Producers). 
151 See APC, supra note 148, at Art. XVI. 
152 Id. Playwrights are not required to use an APC as an industry 
requirement; rather, the Dramatists Guild requires use of an APC for 
membership.  A playwright is free to leave the Dramatists Guild and negotiate 
on her own if she is willing to take less favorable terms than those promulgated 
under the APC. 
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deals with producers.153 This is because the Dramatists Guild is a 
trade organization rather than a labor union, and therefore, its 
activities are not shielded from federal anti-trust laws.154 In fact, 
over the last sixty years, the Dramatists Guild has been involved in 
numerous disputes regarding the applicability of restrictions under 
the Sherman Act.155 
The first major dispute involving a standard contract certified 
by the Dramatists Guild was brought before the United States 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1945.156 The plaintiff, a 
                                                           
153 JARVIS, supra note 24, at 80. The playwright must ultimately decide to 
hold her ground and only accept APC terms, and thus stay within her 
membership requirements as set by the Dramatists Guild, or negotiate for less 
favorable terms and choose to lose the benefits of being a member of the 
Dramatists Guild.  For many, the opportunity to be produced at all outweighs 
the harm of taking less than favorable terms.  However, the more playwrights 
unable to acquire APC terms, the greater the dilution to the bargaining power of 
all playwrights. 
154 “The term ‘antitrust laws’ has the meaning given it in section (a) of the 
first section of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2007), except that such term 
includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 
(2007), to the extent that such section applies to unfair methods of competition.” 
See Playwrights Licensing Relief Act of 2002, S. 2082, 107th Cong. (2002).  
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prevent economic harm caused by 
restraints of trade, such as price-fixing. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2007) (“Every 
contract . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to 
be illegal.”).  Setting minimum standards in a contract, such as the APC, has 
been interpreted as a form of price-fixing. See Ring v. Spina (Ring I), 148 F.2d 
647, 650 (2d Cir. 1945).   
 Anti-trust laws seek to ensure that competitors be treated fairly, promote 
equal opportunities, and to disperse economic and social power. See THE 
SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP SERIES, COMMENTARY ON THE ROLE 
OF ECONOMICS IN ANTITRUST LAW 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/2_06WG3Report.pdf; see 
also Zamora, supra note 18, at 399 (“If associations are not deemed labor 
unions, the Sherman Act prohibits them from collectively negotiating the terms 
of licensing agreements . . . .”). 
155 The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the 
Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of the 
Dramatists Guild of America). 
156 Ring I, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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producer, took over production of a play from another producer 
who had already signed the Dramatists Guild’s Minimum Basic 
Agreement (a pre-cursor to the APC) with the defendants, the 
authors of the play.157 When the replacement producer attempted 
to make changes to the play without the authors’ consent, the 
authors brought a breach of contract claim for failure to obtain their 
consent.158 The Second Circuit held that the new producer made a 
prima facie showing of illegality, emphasizing that the producer 
was exactly the type of person whom the Sherman Act sought to 
protect.159 Though the producer was not awarded any damages and 
the injunction which required the authors to offer the producer the 
chance to produce the play was later discontinued,160 the decision 
strongly suggested that playwrights were not employees, and the 
Dramatists Guild, therefore, was not a labor union entitled to the 
labor exemption to the anti-trust law.161 
Subsequent case law involving the theater further exacerbated 
the tenuous position of the Dramatists Guild.162 In Bernstein v. 
                                                           
157 Id.  at 649. 
158 Id. The authors requested arbitration pursuant to the agreement, but the 
producer sued, claiming that the authors and the Dramatists Guild had violated 
the Sherman Act by creating a monopolistic contract through collective 
bargaining among members of the Dramatists Guild. Id. The Dramatists Guild 
argued it was a labor union and should come under the § 17 exemption of the 
Sherman Act. Id. 
159 Id. at 653. The court argued that the Sherman Act seeks to protect an 
individual from “combinations fashioned by others and offered to such 
individual as the only feasible method by which he may do business.” Id. 
160 The issue of damages was remanded to the District Court, which held 
that since the allegations made on the motion for a preliminary injunction had 
been proven, the producer was entitled to injunctive relief. Ring v. Spina (Ring 
II), 84 F. Supp. 403, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Both the producer and the 
Dramatists Guild appealed. In a decision by Judge Learned Hand, the Second 
Circuit discontinued the injunction because of the absence of a “tangible 
probability that the wrong [would] be repeated.” Ring v. Spina (Ring III), 186 
F.2d 637, 643 (2d Cir. 1951). See also Ring I, 148 F.2d at 649; Ring II, 186 
F.3d at 643. 
161 See Ring II, 84 F. Supp. at 408; Ring III, 186 F.2d at 643. 
162 Hearing, supra note 155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of 
America). 
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Universal Pictures,163 the Second Circuit held that movie and 
television composers were independent contractors rather than 
employees, and thus violated the Sherman Act by collectively 
bargaining with producers.164 The same year, however, the court in 
Julien v. Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Inc.,165 
found that stage directors are employees and not independent 
contractors like playwrights or composers.166 The contrary 
decisions regarding other creatives’ statuses as either independent 
contractors or employees,167 using playwrights as a comparison,168 
left the Dramatists Guild exposed to more antitrust litigation. 
Almost forty years after Ring v. Spina, the League of New 
York Theaters and Producers (“the League”) again brought the 
Dramatists Guild’s Minimum Basic Production Contract 
(“MBPC”) under fire.169 Richard Barr, the president of the League, 
alleged a conspiracy among playwrights and the Dramatists Guild 
“to restrain trade and commerce in the sale of authors’ works for 
                                                           
163 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975) (antitrust dispute between Composers and 
Lyricists Guild of America (“CLGA”) and a group of television and motion 
picture producers asking whether composers are employees or independent 
contractors). The CLGA and the Dramatists Guild are similar in status and 
purpose. Both organizations are advocacy groups composed of creators that are 
independent contractors but whom wish to negotiate collectively with producers. 
See id. 
164 Id. at 980.  (“[A]ntitrust jurisdiction cannot be declined simply because 
independent contractors masquerade as a union.”). The Bernstein decision, by 
ruling against another group of creators who are not protected by a labor union, 
strengthened producers’ ability to assert antitrust claims against the Dramatists 
Guild. See, e.g., Barr v. Dramatists Guild, 573 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
165 No. 68 Civ. 5120, 1975 WL 957 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1975) (plaintiff, a 
stage producer, brought an antitrust action against defendant, an organization of 
directors and choreographers in violation of the § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1 (1974)). 
166 Id., at *3. The court argued that a producer has a significant amount of 
control over the stage director, unlike the limited amount of control the producer 
has over the playwright. Because the producer has final control over every aspect 
of the director’s job, the court held that stage directors are employees. Id. 
167 See Bernstein, 517 F.2d at 976; Julien, 1975 WL 957, at *3. 
168 Julien, 1975 WL 957, at *3. 
169 Barr, 573 F. Supp. at 555. 
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legitimate theatrical attractions”170 by agreeing not to license plays 
to producers except upon the minimum terms in the MBPC.171 The 
Dramatists Guild counterclaimed against the producers, alleging 
that it was the League172 that violated the Sherman Act by setting 
non-competitive maximum levels of compensation for 
playwrights.173 The court only decided the producers’ motion to 
dismiss or stay the contingent counterclaim, holding that the 
Dramatists Guild could bring a counterclaim.174 The competing 
antitrust claims produced a deadlock that eventually resulted in an 
amicable settlement and a renegotiated APC satisfactory to both 
sides.175 However, the threat of antitrust litigation remained and the 
APC has not been revised since that settlement in 1983.176 
Even though the above cases date back several decades, the 
same problems remain as the Dramatists Guild continues to be 
prevented from renegotiating the APC by collective bargaining.177 
The APC no longer reflects the best terms for either playwrights or 
producers,178 yet the Dramatists Guild is powerless to improve the 
situation.179 Legislation must be passed to allow the Dramatists 
                                                           
170 Id. at 557. 
171 Id. 
172 Specifically, the Dramatists Guild alleged that the Shubert Organization 
and the Nederland Organization, which at the time controlled about 70% of the 
first-class theaters in New York, were in violation of the Sherman Act. Barr, 
573 F. Supp. at 558. See also infra note 231. 
173 Barr, 573 F. Supp. at 558. The claim concluded that if and to the 
extent that the MBPC was an antitrust violation, it was one in which the theater 
owners and producers had used their monopoly power to force the Dramatists 
Guild to agree to what became maximum, not minimum, terms set at artificially 
low prices by the dominant party. JOHN G. KOELTL & JOHN KIERNAN, THE 
LITIGATION MANUAL: PRETRIAL 55 (1999). 
174 Barr, 573 F. Supp. at 563. 
175 KOELTL & KIERNAN, supra note 173, at 55. 
176 Hearing, supra note 155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of 
America). 
177 Id. 
178 Like any industry, economic realities of the theatre industry have 
evolved since the APC was last revised. 
179 Hearing, supra note 155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of 
America). 
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Guild and other peer groups of playwrights to collectively bargain 
with groups of producers. The ability for playwrights to negotiate 
with the support of the Dramatists Guild in the same way that 
screenwriters negotiate with the support of the WGA is especially 
important now as more Hollywood studios migrate to Broadway 
to do business with playwrights.180 
III.  THE PLAYWRIGHTS LICENSING ANTITRUST INITIATIVE ACT 
The power to negotiate as a group is not limited to 
screenwriters and other employees of Hollywood studios.181 Along 
with the recent screenwriters strike, in November 2007, stagehands 
represented by the Local One of IATSE182 went on strike after 
negotiations broke down with the League of American Theaters and 
Producers.183 The strike caused the shutdown of 27 shows on 
Broadway and a loss in revenue of approximately $17 million per 
day.184 The strike lasted for 19 days and was the longest union-
supported strike in the theater industry since a musicians’ strike in 
1975.185 
In both the WGA and IATSE strikes this past year, issues 
arose regarding the negotiation of current and future contracts.186 It 
should logically follow that playwrights should have the same right 
to strike in negotiations, yet, this is not the case.187 Current 
                                                           
180 See, e.g., Borys Kit, Marvel Spins Spider-Man into Broadway Musical, 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER.COM, Apr. 20, 2007, at 2. 
181 See, e.g., Campbell Robertson, Broadway’s Showdown: The Lowdown, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at B1. 
182 Id. at B1 (describing the Local One of IATSE as “the most powerful of 
Broadway unions”). 
183 Id. 
184 Campbell Robertson, On Broadway, Gloom Hangs Over Holidays, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at A1. 
185 Campbell Robertson, On Broadway: Deal Reached by Stagehands, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2007, at A1. 
186 See Verrier & Eller, supra note 126; see also Robertson, supra note 
185. 
187 See Hearing, supra note 155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of 
America). 
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antitrust laws188 prevent playwrights from collectively negotiating 
a standard form contract for the production of their works.189 This 
puts playwrights at a distinct disadvantage in bargaining with 
producers.190 With this disadvantage in mind, Congress has 
attempted to amend antitrust laws and enable playwrights to 
bargain collectively under the Playwright Licensing Antitrust 
Initiative Act, which, although sponsored numerous times in the 
House and Senate, has yet to be put to a vote.191 
A.  Precursors to the Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative 
Act 
On December 19, 2001, Congressmen Henry Hyde and Barney 
Frank introduced the Fair Play for Playwrights Act of 2001 to the 
House of Representatives.192 The bill’s purpose was to “modify 
the application of the antitrust laws to authorize collective 
negotiations among playwrights and producers regarding the 
development, licensing, and production of plays.”193 The bill would 
modify antitrust laws to allow associations of playwrights194 to 
establish and enforce “minimum terms and conditions on which the 
works of such playwrights could be developed, licensed, or 
produced,” and allowed playwrights and producers to have 
                                                           
188 See supra text accompanying note 154; see also Hearing, supra note 
155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of America). 
189 Hearing, supra note 28 (statement of Senator Orin Hatch) (“As a result, 
playwrightswho are frequently at a substantial bargaining disadvantageare 
forced to accept contracts on a take it or leave it basis.”). 
190 Id. Though playwrights in theory maintain control over their intellectual 
property, they must defend against producers taking control of their works 
contractually. With the swell of powerful movie studios flooding Broadway as 
producers, it is getting harder for playwrights to fight to keep their intellectual 
property in solo negotiations. See Weidman, supra note 6, at 644 (“[T]he 
pressures are intense, and with the appearance of more and more studio-produced 
musicals . . . those pressures are only going to grow more intense.”). 
191 Zamora, supra note 18, at 395. See, e.g., Playwrights Licensing 
Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, S. 2349, 108th Cong. (2004). 
192 Fair Play for Playwrights Act of 2001, H.R. 3543, 107th Cong. (2001). 
193 H.R. 3543. 
194 E.g., the Dramatists Guild. 
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discussions “for the purpose of negotiating, implementing, or 
enforcing a standard form contract or other collective agreement 
governing the terms and conditions on which playwrights’ works 
will be developed, licensed, or produced.”195 Although the bill was 
referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, it never reached 
the voting stage.196 
In another attempt to push similar legislation, Senators Orrin 
Hatch and Chuck Schumer introduced the Playwrights Licensing 
Relief Act of 2002 to the Senate.197 This bill proposed that 
antitrust laws should not apply to “any joint discussion, 
consideration, review, action, or agreement for the express purpose 
of, and limited to, the development of a standard form contract 
containing minimum terms of artistic protection and levels of 
compensation for playwrights.”198 This second attempt made clear 
that the collective negotiation powers would be limited to the 
creation of a modern APC.199 Unfortunately, the bill met a similar 
                                                           
195 H.R. 3543. 
196 The House bill was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on 
December 19, 2001. See GovTracks for H.R. 3543, http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h107-3543 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). Failure to act on 
the bill essentially kills it until it can be reintroduced in the next Congress. See 
Government 101: How a Bill Becomes Law, http://www.votesmart.org/ 
resource_govt101_02.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
197 Playwrights Licensing Relief Act of 2002, S. 2082, 107th Cong. 
(2002), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s107-2082 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
198 S. 2082; see Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 
Senate, Apr. 10, 2002 (Senator Hatch’s introduction of S. 2082 before the 
Senate), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r107:2:./temp/ 
~r107NIwQ2g:e0 (“Playwrights and their voluntary peer membership 
organization, the Dramatists Guild, operate under the shadow of the antitrust 
laws, and substantially without the ability to coordinate their actions in 
protecting their interests. This has impeded playwrights’ ability to act 
collectively in dealing with highly-organized and unionized groups, such as 
actors, directors, and choreographers, on the one hand, and the increasingly 
consolidated producers and investors on the other.”). 
199 S. 2082. The bill revised the language of Section 2 of the bill to specify 
that antitrust laws shall not apply to “joint or collective voluntary actions for 
the limited purposes of developing a standard form contract by playwrights or 
their representatives.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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fate as the one sponsored in the House—it was read twice and once 
again was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary where it 
died.200 
Continuing to fight for playwrights, Senator Hatch, along with 
Senator Edward Kennedy, again introduced the bill to the Senate, 
using the same language but with a new titlethe Playwrights 
Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004 (“PLAI”).201 The new 
bill gathered more momentum than its predecessor and hearings 
were held before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 28, 
2004.202 The committee heard testimony from famous playwrights 
Wendy Wasserstein,203 Stephen Sondheim,204 and Arthur Miller,205 
representatives of the Dramatists Guild,206 and representatives 
from the League of American Theaters and Producers,207 as well as 
opening remarks from Senator Hatch.208 
                                                           
200 See S. 2082. 
201 Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, S. 2349, 108th 
Cong. (2004). 
202 The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the 
Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004). 
203 Author of Tony Award and Pulitzer Prize winning play “The Heidi 
Chronicles.” See Charles Isherwood, Wendy Wasserstein Dies at 55; Her Plays 
Spoke to a Generation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at A1. 
204 Author of works such as “Follies” (1971), “A Little Night Music” 
(1973), “Pacific Overtures” (1976), “Sweeney Todd” (1979) and “Merrily We 
Roll Along” (1981). See Internet Broadway Database, http://www.ibdb.com/ 
person.asp?ID=12430 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
205 Author of “Death of a Salesman” (1949) and “The Crucible” (1953). See 
Internet Broadway Database http://www.ibdb.com/person.asp?ID=4316 (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
206 See Hearing, supra note 75 (statement of Marsha Norman, Vice 
President, Dramatists Guild). 
207 See The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding 
the Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. 
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Roger 
Berlind, Producer). 
208 See Hearing, supra note 28 (statement of Senator Orin Hatch). 
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1. Testimony in Support of PLAI 
First, Senator Hatch noted that the PLAI would enable 
playwrights, through the Dramatists Guild and any other peer 
organizations, to collectively deal with “other industry groups that 
operate both under and behind the bright lights of the American 
stage.”209 He emphasized that the bill only covered collective 
adoption and implementation, as opposed to collective 
enforcement, of an updated APC.210 Such a distinction is important 
because the functional purpose of the PLAI is to allow for the 
emendation and modernization of the APC, which individual 
playwrights can then use as a template in individual negotiations.211 
Such collective deal making was important because, as playwright 
Wendy Wasserstein testified, the voice of the playwright “has 
become much more challenged as the ownership of the theaters and 
the production of plays has become increasingly dominated by 
corporate interests.”212 
Ms. Wasserstein emphasized that every other creative 
contributor to the theater had union representation and is able to 
bargain collectively, leaving playwrights at a distinct 
disadvantage.213 Importantly, she stated that the purpose of the 
PLAI was not to “force a producer to produce a play,” but rather, 
to develop a standard form contract so that the playwright’s 
copyright would be “respected throughout the production of [a 
play].”214 
                                                           
209 Id. 
210 Id. (“My hope is that the basic ability to update the standard form 
contract as well as provisions ensuring that certain artists’ rights are respected in 
the production of their plays will encourage young, struggling playwrights to 
continue working in the field.”). 
211 See The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding 
the Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. 




214 Id. Wasserman echoes the concerns of Dramatists Guild president John 
Weidman, who foresees the fight for control between the playwright and major 
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Similarly stressing the need for improved future relations, 
Stephen Sondheim, former president of the Dramatists Guild215 and 
current member of its Council,216 emphasized that the bill was not 
necessarily for the benefit of established playwrights like himself, 
but rather it was for the younger generation of playwrights 
struggling to negotiate with ever-powerful producers.217 To 
illustrate the extent of a playwright’s struggle, he told the 
Committee an anecdote about his play “Merrily We Role Along,” 
written to go backwards in time, starting at the end and proceeding 
to the beginning.218 At one time, a producer demanded that Mr. 
Sondheim reverse the order of eventscompletely contrary to his 
artistic invention.219 Mr. Sondheim pointed out that while he was 
able to maintain the integrity of his intellectual property because of 
his status in the theater industry, many young unknown 
playwrights do not have the same leverage when negotiating with 
producers.220 
Some of the testimony before the Committee focused more on 
the detrimental after-effects that would likely come from continued 
strained relations between playwrights and producers. In his 
                                                           
motion picture studios acting as producers (Wasserman’s “coprporate interests”) 
as a “slippery slope down which the playwright’s copyright [control] runs the 
risk of sliding into oblivion.” Weidman, supra note 6, at 645. 
215 Sondheim served as president from 1973 to 1981. The Playwrights 
Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the Future of American Live 
Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Stephen Sondheim, 
playwright).  During his tenure as president, he founded the Young Playwrights, 
Inc. which supports the work of playwrights under the age of eighteen. See 
Sondheim on YPI, http://www.youngplaywrights.org/ from%20Steve.htm (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
216 The Board of Directors of the Dramatists Guild is called the Council. 
The general management, direction, and control of the Dramatists Guild vests 
with the Council and the Council would have the authority to negotiate a new 
APC if the PLAI were passed. See Constitution of the Dramatists Guild of 
America, Inc., Art. V, Sec. 1, available at http://www.dramatistsguild. 
com/about_ constitution.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
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testimony, playwright Arthur Miller argued that “American theater 
risks losing the next generation of playwrights to other media and 
opportunities as the pressures on playwrights increase and their 
power to protect their economic and artistic interests diminish.”221 
Mr. Miller emphasized that with the growing pressures of 
corporate interests in the theater, “only one entity does not have a 
seat at the bargaining table: the playwrights.”222 He explained that 
the PLAI would allow the APC to be updated to “take account of 
today’s market realities and intellectual property protection 
climate.”223 
Vice president of the Dramatists Guild, Marsha Norman, 
agreed with Mr. Miller that young playwrights were being lost “to 
television and other unionized venues which pay them in advance 
and don’t quibble over the price.”224 She noted that half of her 
students in the Julliard playwriting program in 2004 left for 
California to talk to television-show runners and producers and 
argued that once writers leave the theater, they rarely return.225 
Ms. Norman contended that without a standard contract for young 
and mid-career playwrights to rely upon, they would continue to 
leave the theater and lose the creative rights afforded to them as 
playwrights in exchange for being guaranteed a paycheck in 
Hollywood.226 
                                                           
221 The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the 
Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Arthur Miller). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. Miller notes that the APC has not been updated since 1982. Since 
that time, intellectual property has increasingly come under the control of 
corporate interests like major motion picture studios, and Miller advocates that 
the PLAI should be passed so that the APC can meet and counter the demands 
of these powerful corporate interests. Id. 
224 Hearing, supra note 75 (statement of Marsha Norman, Vice President, 
Dramatists Guild). 
225 Id. (“[W]e try to warn the writers about the dangers of work for hire, but 
at the moment, the Broadway arena is offering them little reason to stay.”). 
226 Id. Unlike the guaranteed paycheck in Hollywood, few playwrights’ 
works are ever produced, so while they maintain their intellectual property, it 
has no real value for the struggling playwrights. See Weidman, supra note 6, at 
642; see also Jonakait, supra note 69, at 403–04. 
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In addition to the testimony given before Congress by these 
prominent playwrights, the Dramatists Guild of America 
submitted its own statement for the hearing record.227 The official 
statement addressed the string of decisions involving the 
Dramatists Guild and its resulting inability to collectively 
bargain.228 The Dramatists Guild argued that the cases attempted to 
reconcile labor and anti-trust issues, but face “a daunting challenge 
in the unique environment of the Broadway Theater.”229 Moreover, 
it pointed out that the PLAI was not an attempt to reconcile larger 
issues of anti-trust and labor law, but rather a simple solution to 
the small but important arena of American theaterthe ability to 
renegotiate and modernize the APC without breaking the law.230 
2. Testimony in Opposition to PLAI 
Not all parties at the Committee hearing, however, were 
supportive of the proposed legislation. Representing the 
opposition to the PLAI were the producers, backed by the 
Broadway League.231 Gerald Schoenfeld, Chairman of both the 
Shubert Organization232 and of the Broadway League,233 testified in 
                                                           
227 Hearing, supra note 155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of 
America). 
228 Id; see Ring I, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945); Julien v. Soc’y of Stage 
Directors & Choreographers, No. 68 Civ. 5120, 1975 WL 957, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 14, 1975); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
229 Hearing, supra note 155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of 
America). The Guild argues that because the Broadway theater industry is 
unique in the way that it conducts business, it is difficult to categorize 
dramatists as common law employees or independent contractors in the same 
way those labels are used in more traditional labor scenarios. Id. Because of this 
difficulty in categorization, the Dramatists Guild argues the PLAI is necessary as 
an appropriate remedy. Id. 
230 Id. 
231 See Hearing, supra note 146 (statement of Gerald Schoenfeld, Chairman 
of The League of American Theaters and Producers); Hearing, supra note 207 
(statement of Roger Berlind, Producer). 
232 The Shubert Organization is the oldest and largest theater owner on 
Broadway, owning and operating seventeen Broadway theaters and one Off-
Broadway theater. The Shubert Organization not only owns the theaters, it also 
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opposition to the bill.234 Above all, Mr. Schoenfeld expressed his 
concern that because producers had to worry about the evolving 
demands of theatre, they needed the flexibility to respond to 
situations, as they arose, through individual negotiations.235 
Specifically, he explained that under the APC, it had been 
necessary for producers to draft addendums to each individual 
agreement since 1985 in order to meet the demands of modern 
theater, e.g., the creation of royalty pools.236 However, Schoenfeld 
argued that the negotiating power of producers would be hindered 
if producers were required to negotiate using the terms of the APC 
and comply with Dramatists Guild certification.237 
                                                           
produces plays and controls almost all Broadway ticket sales through its 
subsidiary Telecharge. See Shubert Organization homepage, http://www. 
shubertorganization.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). The Dramatists Guild 
contends that the Shubert Organization has kept a harsh grip over the theater 
industry for years, not only controlling 70% of the first-class theaters but also 
dominating the Broadway League by dictating the terms on which they will 
produce playwrights’ plays. See Barr v. Dramatists Guild, 573 F. Supp. 555, 
558 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
233 The Broadway League, formerly the League of American Theaters and 
Producers, is the national trade association for theater owners, producers, and 
general theater managers. See Broadway League homepage, http://www. 
broadwayleague.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
234 Hearing, supra note 146 (statement of Gerald Schoenfeld, Chairman of 
The League of American Theaters and Producers) (“If there are any restraints 
upon the production of plays and musicals they are imposed by the [Dramatists] 
Guild and its members and not the producers or the venue operators.”). 
235 Id. 
236 Because the form APC was last negotiated in 1985, it is necessary to 
add terms that were not common practice 25 years ago, such as forms of press, 
approval of venues, and royalty pools. Id. A royalty pool provides for a certain 
percentage of the weekly net profits to be allocated to the royalty participants 
(producers, playwright, director, among others) by creating an equation where 
the total of all of the royalty percentages is the denominator and the numerator is 
the percentage paid to each royalty participant. Id. As Schoenfeld explains, if the 
royalty pool participants receive 35% of the weekly operating profits, the total 
royalties are 15%, and the playwright’s negotiated royalty is 6%, then the 
playwright in the pool receives 6/15 of 35% of the weekly net profits. Id. 
237 Id. Schoenfeld reargues the stance of the Broadway League in Barr v. 
Dramatists Guild, 573 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), that the APC restrains 
trade by imposing minimum terms. Id. However, Schoenfeld fails to consider 
KELLY 7/21/08  4:06 PM 
914 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Similarly, Broadway producer Roger Berlind testified that 
freeing playwrights from the restraints of antitrust laws would be 
detrimental for both competition and playwrights.238 Because there 
are so many variables in producing a play, producers needed 
flexibility in the terms they set.239 He stressed that if the PLAI 
were passed, it would destroy the free market of theater producing 
and instead place the Dramatists Guild as the “gatekeeper” to pre-
agreed terms.240 
Ultimately, while the PLAI of 2004 made it to the hearing 
stage, the Senate never put it to a vote and the bill died yet again.241 
A strong handful of supporters for the proposed legislation 
remained, however. A few months after the bill died in the Senate, 
the identical bill, again entitled the PLAI of 2004, was introduced in 
the House on June 18, 2004, sponsored by Representatives 
Howard Coble, John Conyers, Jr., Barney Frank, and Henry 
Hyde.242 The bill once again failed to be taken to a vote.243 Not to 
be dissuaded, less than a year later, Representatives Coble, 
Conyers, Frank, and Hyde again attempted to introduce the PLAI 
of 2005 in the House.244 Predictably, with the language of the bill 
                                                           
that the PLAI allows for the renegotiation and revision of the APC and therefore 
does not force acceptance of the contested terms. 
238 Hearing, supra note 207 (statement of Roger Berlind, Producer). 
239 Berlind argues that all producers do not agree on having the same 
structure, price, or terms so it is a misstep to assume that all playwrights agree 
on the same standards either. Id. 
240 Berlind comes from a Wall Street investment banking background and 
draws parallels between producing theater and taking investment risks. Id. He 
argues that he has a fiduciary obligation to investors and that allowing the 
playwrights to set minimum terms would infringe upon his ability to make a 
profit. Id. 
241 See Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, S. 2349, 
108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill. 
xpd?bill=s108-2349 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
242 Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, H.R. 4615, 
108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill. 
xpd?bill=h108-4615 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
243 See H.R. 4615. 
244 Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2005, H.R. 532, 109th 
Cong. (2005), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill. 
xpd?bill=h109-532 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
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unchanged, it again died on the floor without a vote.245 Though the 
proposed bills up until this point have been unsuccessful in making 
it to the voting stage, advocates have not yet given up and continue 
to lobby for the PLAI. Over the past year, the Dramatists Guild 
has been lobbying in both the House and the Senate for an 
exception from labor laws, as embodied in the PLAI bill, so that 
they may collectively bargain without violating antitrust laws.246  
Meanwhile, the Broadway League has been successfully spending 
their time and money lobbying Congress to stall on the Dramatists 
Guild’s legislative proposals.247 
IV.  WHY CONGRESS SHOULD ACT NOW 
Given the competing agendas and continued struggle between 
playwrights and producers, the PLAI represents a worthwhile 
attempt to address and correct the disparate bargaining power 
between the parties.248 It is undeniable that producers on 
Broadway are very financially strong,249 and the Broadway League, 
controlled by the Shubert Foundation, has at times resembled a 
monopoly.250 Nevertheless, with the ever-growing influx of 
Hollywood studios producing on Broadway251 and the subsequent 
mounting pressure to do business according to a Hollywood model, 
as with screenwriters,252 the gulf in bargaining strength between 
playwrights and powerful studios as producers has grown even 
wider.253 
                                                           
245 See H.R. 532. 
246 E-mail from David Faux, Director of Business Affairs, Dramatists Guild, 
to Ashley Kelly (Oct. 17, 2007, 14:25:17 EST) (on file with author). 
247 Id. 
248 See Zamora, supra note 18, at 428. 
249 For example, the Shubert Organization gives out millions of dollars 
worth of grants to attract shows to its theaters. See N.R. Kleinfield, I.R.S. 
Ruling Wrote Script for the Shubert Tax Break, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1994, at 
A1. 
250 See Barr v. Dramatists Guild, 573 F. Supp. 555, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
See also supra text accompanying note 232. 
251 See, e.g., Kuchwara, supra note 4. 
252 Weidman, supra note 6, at 644. 
253 Id. 
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A.  Battling the Giants: Hollywood Studios on Broadway 
The influx of Hollywood producers to Broadway was, in a 
way, entirely foreseeable. For large motion picture studios with a 
hit film, a move to adapt a pic-to-legit musical for Broadway has an 
added advantage over other straight Broadway productions.254 As 
opposed to an original musical like “Avenue Q”255 that must build 
a reputation by word of mouth,256 people already have an interest 
in “Spider-Man the Musical”257 or “The Little Mermaid”258 
because they saw, and likely enjoyed, the films.259 Because the 
branding for a pic-to-legit musical is already in place,260 Broadway 
has become yet another arena for movie studios to expand their 
successful franchises.261 Inevitably, this is why almost every major 
studio is making its mark on Broadway, including Fox Theatricals 
producing “Legally Blonde The Musical,”262 Dreamworks 
                                                           
254 See Rogers, supra note 5. 
255 “Avenue Q,” the surprise winner of the 2004 Tony award for Best 
Musical, started out in a small Off-Broadway theater before transferring to 
Broadway after a year. See Jesse McKinley, “Avenue Q” Tony Coup is Buzz of 
Broadway, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2004, at E1. 
256 See Rogers, supra note 5. 
257 The musical adaptation of the 2002 Spider-Man film produced by Sony 
Pictures is currently in development stages. See Ernio Hernandez, Spider-Man 
Musical to Take Gotham in Upcoming Reading, PLAYBILL, Apr. 16, 2007, 
available at http://www.playbill.com/news/article/107378.html. 
258 The musical adaptation of the 1989 animated Disney film opened on 
Broadway on January 10, 2008. See Ben Brantley, Fish Out of Water in the 
Deep Blue Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, at E1. 
259 See Rogers, supra note 5. 
260 Id. 
261 See, e.g., Kuchwara, supra note 4. The Shrek franchise is an apt 
example, with the forthcoming musical joining the revenue streams from toys, t-
shirts, and more film sequels. See Weidman, supra note 6, at 644. In the recent 
review of “The Little Mermaid” musical, Ben Brantley remarked that the show 
felt like a cynical reversal of art and commerce: “It used to be that the show 
came first, followed by merchandising tie-ins. Thoroughly plastic and 
trinketlike, this show seems less like an interpretation of a movie musical than 
of the figurines and toys it inspired.” Brantley, supra note 257, at E1. 
262 See Cox, supra note 1, at 39. 
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Animation producing “Shrek The Musical,”263 Sony Pictures 
Entertainment producing “Spider-Man The Musical,”264 and of 
course Disney, which hopes to mimic past Broadway successes 
“Beauty and the Beast” and “The Lion King” with new 
productions of “Mary Poppins” and “The Little Mermaid.”265 
Successful branding and automatic audiences, however, are not 
the only things that Hollywood producers attempt to bring with 
them to Broadway. Studios also come prepared to do business 
with playwrights in the same manner they do business with 
screenwriters266—intending to contract with playwrights in such a 
way as to maintain control of their valuable franchises, including 
copyright control.267 In the same way that the studios argue that 
their financial interests behind a film entitle them to control over 
authorship, they are attempting to secure intellectual property 
rights from playwrights as well.268 
The clearest example of this growing disparity in bargaining 
power is illustrated by the studios’ attempts to apply the work for 
hire doctrine to playwrights, and the playwrights’ inability to 
effectively fight back against the studios.269 While a playwright 
may challenge a work for hire clause as playwrights are neither 
employees of the theatre or the Hollywood studio,270 nor among 
the nine categories of works that can be specially ordered or 
commissioned,271 most playwrights do not have the financial 
                                                           
263 See BWW News Desk, Shrek Musical Announces Creative Team, ‘08 
Debut Potential, BROADWAY WORLD, Oct. 12, 2006, available at http://www. 
broadwayworld.com/viewcolumn.cfm?colid=12880. 
264 See Kit, supra note 180, at 2. 
265 See Weidman, supra note 6, at 645. See also Kuchwara, supra note 4. 
266 See Weidman, supra note 6, at 645. 
267 See id. 
268 See Gulick, supra note 99, at 66. 
269 See Weidman, supra note 6, at 644 (“[T]he most aggressive of the 
movie studios [bring] with them . . . a desire to do business, not according to 
the theater model which puts the playwright in first position, but according to 
the Hollywood model, in which the producing studio own[s] the author’s 
copyright and writers [can] be hired and fired at will.”). 
270 See Weidman, supra note 6, at 641–42. 
271 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007). 
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resources to raise such a challenge in court.272 Even assuming the 
work for hire clause could be contracted around, studios are still 
frequently able to exercise their superior bargaining power in 
obtaining assignments from playwrights,273 effectually taking away 
the playwrights’ creative property rights anyway. 
A hypothetical will further illustrate the impact of a work-for-
hire clause, as well as the unequal bargaining between the parties. 
Consider the following: A writer with both a playwrighting and 
screenwriting background receives a Writers Agreement from a large 
motion picture studio to adapt a non-fiction book. The contract 
combines screenwriting services with an additional clause called 
“Playwright Services,” granting the writer the first opportunity to 
write the musical based on the screenplay he was hired to write. 
The clause could include the language “these services shall be 
rendered on a ‘work-for-hire basis’ for copyright purposes,” 
meaning that the writer signs over both his copyright of the 
screenplay, as well as the copyright in stage rights. More 
specifically, the contract may grant the studio rights that are very 
broad: “for all time, exclusively and throughout the world, all rights 
to use the Property as the basis of or in connection with stage 
plays (straight plays or musicals) and other live theatrical 
productions, and all ancillary and subsidiary rights related thereto.”  
Under this language, the studio, before the screenplay has even 
been written, takes control of the stage rights, using the language 
“work for hire” to do so. Further, the contractual language may also 
include a tagline such as,  “and if this is not a work-for-hire, then it 
is an assignment.” While the writer may attempt to negotiate with 
the studio to license his stage rights, he unfortunately must handle 
the negotiation because, unlike the WGA, the Dramatists Guild is 
not able to negotiate minimum terms without violating antitrust 
laws. Likely, the writer will be told by the studio that altering the 
stage rights is a deal-breaker. Desperate to not lose the deal, the 
writer will often sign away all of his rights. 
                                                           
272 Additionally, the Dramatists Guild as a trade organization is not in a 
position to give legal aid to individual members. 
273 Smith, supra note 96, at 30. Contracts will often state that if the work 
is not a work made for hire then it is an assignment, acting as a catch-all for the 
studio in securing all necessary rights. Id. 
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As the presence of motion picture studios on Broadway grows 
stronger, agreements like the hypothetical are becoming more 
common. Playwrights need the power and protection of the 
Dramatists Guild now more than ever to balance the current 
inequities in bargaining power and the growing threat of 
exploitation. Indeed, “playwrights may often be so desperate to get 
their play produced and seen by audiences, that they will accept 
terms that are detrimental to their own interests.”274 If Congress 
passed the PLAI, the Dramatists Guild could start to regain ground 
in bargaining power and playwrights could begin to feel secure in 
their choice to stay in the world of theater rather than migrating to 
the world of screenwriting. 
Certainly the above demonstrates the extent to which major 
studios may strip playwrights, and screenwriters, of their ultimate 
rights. As noted, unlike screenwriters, playwrights do not have the 
backing of an organized guild that may bargain collectively on their 
behalf. The recent strikes of both the WGA275 and IATSE on 
behalf of Broadway stagehands276 illustrates that guilds can 
effectively assert bargaining power over powerful producers.277 
Fairness requires that Congress level the playing field for 
playwrights as they are the last remaining group of creative 
professionals that must bargain alone278 without the support of a 
guild with collective bargaining authority.279 It is because of the 
strength that the screenwriters have through the power of the 
WGA and the stagehands through the power of IATSE that they 
were able to successfully stand up against studios and producers in 
2007 and 2008 and continue to negotiate effectively today.280 
Congress should no longer favor the power of studios, producers 
                                                           
274 Zamora, supra note 18, at 428. 
275 See Verrier & Eller, supra note 126, at C1. The WGA secured coveted 
residuals for new media. 
276 See Robertson, supra note 185, at B1. 
277 See Verrier & Eller, supra note 126, at C1; Robertson, supra note 185, 
at B1. 
278 See supra Part II.B. 
279 Id. 
280 See Verrier & Eller, supra note 126, at C1; Robertson, supra note 185, 
at B1. 
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and their money, but rather, embrace a policy that stimulates 
creativity by ensuring protection of young playwrights. 
B.  Following Legislative Precedence 
Congress can protect young playwrights by passing the PLAI. 
Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its concern for motion 
picture studios, which argue that the work for hire doctrine 
protects their financial well-being.281 Throughout the revision 
process of the Copyright Act of 1978, Congress argued that work 
for hire was appropriate in light of the power of the WGA282 and 
operated under the assumption that the Dramatists Guild’s 
playwrights “take care of themselves.”283 Today, however, these 
two assumptions are in tension with one another given the influx of 
motion picture studios into the realm of Broadway. The power of 
the studios, which can be managed with the power of a collectively 
bargaining guild, is not a legally viable option for playwrights 
without the PLAI. 
                                                           
281 See MPAA Statement, supra note 85, at 302 (“[W]e have indicated all 
along that provisions such as [the work for hire provisions] are the heart and 
soul of the operation of commercial and personnel relationships in our industry, 
without which there would be a very severe upset. Such remains true today and 
will be the cornerstone of our position with Congress.”). See also Copyright 
Law Revision, Part 2: Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of 
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law Before H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 358–59 (1964) (statement of Motion 
Picture Association of America, Inc.). 
282 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 2237, at 115 (1966) (rejecting proposed “shop 
right” doctrine changes to the work for hire doctrine because “[w]hile the change 
might theoretically improve the bargaining position of screenwriters and others 
as a group, the practical benefits that individual authors would receive are highly 
conjectural.”). 
283 Copyright Law Revision, Part 5: 1964 Revision Bill with Discussion 
and Comments Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 239 (1965) 
(statement made by Irwin Karp, on behalf of the Authors League of America) 
(“The Dramatists Guild represents the very few professional playwrights in the 
United States whose work is presented on Broadway and who are able to take 
care of themselves.”). 
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1. How the Revision Process of the Work for Hire Doctrine from 
1956 to 1976 Informs on Congressional Attitudes Towards 
Bargaining Power of Writers 
The revision of the Copyright Act in 1976 was the culmination 
of two decades of research acquired from the testimony of 
approximately 200 witnesses before the Subcommittee on 
Copyrights.284 One of the major issues considered was the work 
for hire definition, specifically, the category of works prepared on 
special order or commission.285 The preliminary draft of the 
revision defined works made for hire as excluding all works made 
on special order or commission, but the first draft was met with 
“strenuous opposition from . . . motion picture companies.”286 
The motion picture studios asserted that exclusion of specially 
ordered works or commissioned works would create 
insurmountable obstacles and major economic dislocation.287 
Moreover, the motion picture studios argued that because they 
exercised creative control over a composite of screenwriters’ 
works, they should be considered the author for copyright 
purposes.288 While writers argued that the burden of bargaining 
                                                           
284 Smith, supra note 96, at 26–27. 
285 Id. 
286 Anne Marie Hill, The “Work For Hire” Definition in the Copyright 
Act of 1976: Conflict Over Specially Ordered or Commissioned Work, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 559, 581 (1989). 
287 See Copyright Law Revision, Part 4: Further Discussions and 
Comments on Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law Before H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 274 (1964); see also Copyright Law 
Revision, Part 2: Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of 
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law Before H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 153 (1964) (“It must be borne in mind 
that motion picture producers may and do risk millions of dollars in the 
production and exploitation of a film, and by their efforts and expenditure 
substantially enhance the value of the story, novel, or play which is the basis of 
the picture.”). 
288 Hill, supra note 286, at 568. Saul Rittenberg of MGM commented: “If 
I commission a work from a man, ordering a work specially for my purposes, 
and I pay for it, what difference does it make whether I put him under my 
employment contract or establish an independent contractor relationship?” 
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should be placed on the party with more ready access to legal 
advice,289 the motion picture studios countered that the writers 
were represented by guilds, lawyers, and accountants, and 
therefore bargaining power was equal.290  
Another main issue in contention was the writers request for 
something similar to the “shop right” doctrine in patent law, which 
would give the commissioning party the right to use the writer’s 
work to the extent needed but allow the writer to retain all other 
rights as long as she did not authorize a competing use.291 The 
motion picture producers also challenged this right, arguing that the 
costs would be too much to bear for producers.292 Specifically, the 
producers argued that while they took on a number of substantial 
financial risks, motion picture writers were insulated from loss, and 
writers already receive shares of producers’ revenue under 
collective-bargaining agreements set forth by the WGA.293 
Ultimately, Congress had to decide between excluding 
commissioned works and “possibly crippling the production of . . . 
composite works” like films294 or jeopardizing the rights of writers 
by including commissioned works in the work for hire definition.295 
In the end, Congress accepted a compromise: in exchange for 
concessions from the commissioning parties for termination of 
transfer rights in limited circumstances,296 the writers consented to 
the second clause of the work for hire doctrine, which classified 
nine specific categories of works, including motion pictures, as 
works for hire if the parties expressly agreed in writing.297 The 
“shop right” proposal was altogether rejected as “mere conjecture” 
                                                           
Gorman, supra note 86, at 23. 
289 Smith, supra note 96, at 26–27. 
290 Id. 
291 H.R. REP. NO. 2237, at 115 (1966). 
292 H.R. REP. NO. 2237, at 115. 
293 H.R. REP. NO. 2237, at 115. The writers receive their advance and 
option payments no matter what, but the producers take on the risk of loss if the 
film was not successful. 
294 See supra text accompanying note 98. 
295 Hill, supra note 286, at 569–70. 
296 See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1976). 
297 Gorman, supra note 86, at 23. 
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as to its ability to bring a benefit to writers.298 
2. Later Attempts at Revision 
While the writers may not have been as successful as they had 
wished with the Copyright Act of 1976, they continued to argue 
that the writing requirementthat a work for hire clause 
specifically be in contractual languageoffered virtually no 
protection because of their inherent lack of bargaining power to 
exclude such a clause.299 Joining their cause, Senator Cochran 
subsequently attempted to revise the work for hire doctrine by 
regularly introducing a series of bills addressing writers’ concerns 
of a disadvantaged bargaining position.300 Of note, however, is that 
in the language of these bills Senator Cochran proposed to eliminate 
every category of works that may be specially ordered or 
commissioned except motion pictures.301 He argued to Congress 
that motion pictures were uniquely collaborative works requiring a 
work for hire relationship and employees in the motion picture 
industry were sufficiently protected by union and guild contracts 
and therefore less likely to be the victims of overreaching.302 None 
of Senator Cochran’s bills made it out of committee,303 and the 
                                                           
298 H.R. REP. NO. 2237, at 115 (“The presumption that initial ownership 
rights vest in the employer for hire is well established in American copyright 
law . . . To exchange it for the uncertainties of the shop right doctrine would not 
only be of dubious value to employers and employees alike, but might also 
reopen a number of other issues and produce dissension.”). 
299 Hill, supra note 286, at 569. 
300 See Smith, supra note 96, at 21 n.8 (citing S. 2044, 97th Cong. 
(1982); S. 2138, 98th Cong. (1983); S. 2330, 99th Cong. (1986), S. 1223, 
100th Cong. (1987); S. 1253 101st Cong. (1989)). 
301 See S. 2044; S. 2138; S. 2330; S. 1223; S. 1253. 
302 See Smith, supra note 96, at 41. Cochran fails to recognize, however, 
that the guilds were formed out of necessity to fight overreaching. Victimization 
of employees in motion pictures is still quite pervasive even with the guilds. 
The guilds struggle every day to try and prevent pervasive overreaching. 
303 See, e.g., Library of Congress tracking report for S. 1253, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d101:s01253: (last visited Apr. 1, 
2008). 
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Senate never adopted his proposal.304 
Congress previously enacted work for hire legislation which led 
to studios retaining control over motion pictures by accepting 
arguments about equal bargaining strength between screenwriters 
(and their union) and studios. Congress should also fortify the 
American playwrights against the bargaining power of the motion 
picture studios as Broadway producers by passing the PLAI, 
thereby empowering groups of playwright to collectively bargain. 
Additionally, as a matter of policy, copyright law strives to 
protect and motivate individuals whose creativity produce works 
that will enhance the culture and development of society.305 By 
passing the PLAI, Congress will strengthen the bargaining power of 
the next generation of playwrights by giving them an assurance 
through the Dramatists Guild and any other voluntary peer 
organization that their rights are respected and their agreements 
include fair compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
Young screenwriters in Hollywood do not have to negotiate 
with large motion picture studios alone.306 As members of the 
WGA, they enter agreements with the collective voice of all 
screenwriters and strive for fair compensation for all.307 With the 
ever-expanding migration of Hollywood studios to Broadway, 
young playwrights increasingly face negotiations with these same 
motion picture studios—studios that are looking to do business in 
the same way that it is done in Hollywood.308 Congress must not 
leave these playwrights to negotiate alone and without any 
support. By passing the PLAI and allowing for the modernization 
of the Dramatists Guild’s APC, Congress will increase the strength 
of American playwrights’ bargaining power and ensure that the 
vibrancy of American live theater continues for years to come. 
 
                                                           
304 Hill, supra note 286, at 569. 
305 Hill, supra note 286, at 580. 
306 See supra Part II.A. 
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308 See supra Part IV.A. 
